Applying Adaptive Safety Analysis Techniques

Robyn R. Lutz* and Hui-Yin Shaw
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, CA 91109-8099
robyn.lutz@jpl.nasa.gov hui-yin.shaw@jpl.nasa.gov

Abstract

Current needs for high-reliability, reusable software; rapid, evolutionary development; and verification of innovative software architectures have focused attention on improving techniques for analysing the safety and reliability of embedded software. The work reported here integrates two successful safety analysis techniques which have been used separately on software and hardware into the system engineering process. This process combines Software Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (SFMECA) and Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) in a way that can be readily adapted to a particular project’s evolving system needs. The technique was used on two recent space instruments: the Mars Microprobe Project and the Earth Orbiting System’s Microwave Limb Sounder. The main lessons learned from this experience are discussed: (1) flexible use, (2) a risk-driven rather than sequential approach, (3) “zoom-in/zoom-out” use, (4) SFMECA and SFTA as complementary techniques, (5) preserving traceability, and (6) applicability to fault protection software.

1. Introduction

This paper describes the integration of two software safety techniques, Software Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (SFMECA) and Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) into the system engineering process. The application of these techniques on two spacecraft instruments and experience from their use are presented. This work is an extension of previously reported work on integrating software and system safety [9].

The motivation for the work described here derives from the changing needs of the project developers. Current needs for higher reliability, rapid development, reusable software, and innovative software architectures have focused attention on improving design verification techniques. In particular, the successful application of safety-analysis techniques on such projects depends on our ability to adapt existing methodologies to changing development processes.

Safety analysis techniques for high-reliability systems are widely available. However, these methods tend to emphasize full-scale, thorough, “one-size-fits-all” analysis of a system. When a project must back off from this paradigm, due to cost, schedule, or personnel constraints, guidelines are lacking. The work described here addresses this problem by investigating the adaptive use of software safety techniques for the integrated analysis of software and system safety.

The adaptive use of safety analysis techniques is part of a growing interest in software engineering practices that target high-risk or high-usage areas for attention rather than applying a practice uniformly to all areas or components. The fact that these practices are sometimes called “good-enough” (e.g., “good-enough testing”) identifies the challenge to critical systems. On the one hand, high-reliability systems may not be able to afford the risk that “good-enough” practices entail. On the other hand, a careful and prioritized application of these adaptive analytical techniques may yield more reliable components than other options available to small projects with tight cost and schedule constraints.

This paper reports the application of these adaptive practices to components on two space instruments, the New Millenium Program Deep Space 2 Mars Microprobe Project (MM) and the Earth Observing System’s Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS) [2, 13].

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related work and explains the design analysis techniques on which this work is based. Section 3 describes the two applications and the results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Item</th>
<th>Failure Mode</th>
<th>Failure Description</th>
<th>System Effect</th>
<th>Criticality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heater ON</td>
<td>Timing wrong</td>
<td>Heater ON too early</td>
<td>Batteries can't support</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heater ON</td>
<td>Timing wrong</td>
<td>Heater ON too late</td>
<td>Experiment delayed</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heater OFF</td>
<td>Timing wrong</td>
<td>Heater OFF too early</td>
<td>Science data lost</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heater OFF</td>
<td>Timing wrong</td>
<td>Heater OFF too late</td>
<td>Energy allocation exceeded</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Excerpt from SFMECA Table

Section 4 discusses the types of adaptation of full-scale analysis techniques that were used to meet the needs of smaller, shorter projects. Section 5 summarizes the lessons learned from the applications and extracts some key elements which are recommended for any similar process.

2. Related Work

The contribution of this paper is to report experience with the adaptive application of integrated software and system safety techniques. The two techniques that this work is based on are SFMECA (Software Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis) and SFTA (Software Fault Tree Analysis). Since both techniques are well-documented and widely used, only brief descriptions are given here, along with pointers to more extensive descriptions.

FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) and FMECA (Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis) have been widely used for design analysis in military and industrial applications since the mid-sixties. Several FMEA standards exist, including a U.S. Military standard, a NASA standard, and a SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers) standard. See [11] for a description and bibliography.

SFMECA (Software Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis) is a design analysis method that explores the effects of possible software failure modes on the system. SFMECA is an extension of hardware FMECA. SFMECA has been used on several flight projects at Jet Propulsion Laboratory, primarily to verify the correct functioning of system-level fault protection software.

Briefly, SFMECA is a structured, table-based process of discovering and documenting the ways in which a software component can fail and the consequences of those failures. It is most frequently used during the design phase, but has also been used during the requirements phase. The SFMECA process is guided by a set of standardized failure modes (e.g., “Wrong timing of data,” “Abnormal process termination”) which the analyst considers in turn. The SFMECA is a form of forward (bottom-up) analysis. The process traces the propagation of anomalies from causes (failure modes) to local (subsystem or component) effects to global (system) effects [7, 10, 16].

In a SFMECA a criticality rating (e.g., high, medium, or low) is assigned to each failure mode based on the failure’s likelihood of occurrence and the severity of the consequences. Table 1 is an excerpt from a SFMECA that considers the effects of issuing a command to turn on a heater too early and too late.

FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) is a hazard analysis technique that works top-down from an identified undesirable event or hazard to discover its possible causes [5, 7, 19]. FTA uses Boolean logic to decompose an undesirable event into the preconditions that led to the event’s occurrence. It is widely used in the systems and hardware areas [1, 6].

SFTA (Software Fault Tree Analysis) uses a similar method to analyze software code or detailed design [8]. Rushby identifies as the goal of SFTA, “to show that a specific software design will not produce system safety failures or, failing that, to determine the environmental conditions that could lead it to cause such a failure” [18]. Figure 1 is a high-level excerpt from a SFTA that investigates possible software causes for an antenna failure.

Some researchers have performed SFMECA as a preparatory activity to fault tree construction [15]. Others have recommended first performing a search for causes (as in an FTA) and then considering the effects of each failure (as in a FMECA) [17]. Combining forward and backward analyses, or the bottom-up SFMECA with the top-down SFTA, has been found to be effective in understanding underlying combination of circumstances that enable a failure mode to occur, as well as the likelihood of the identified failure mode [4, 10]. The effectiveness of SFMECA is also increased by integrating it with existing system FMEA or system FTA.
Figure 1: Excerpt from a SFTA

3. Pilot Applications

This section describes the results of the adaptive applications of the integrated safety analyses to the New Millenium Program Deep Space 2 Mars Microprobe Project (MM) and the Earth Observing System's Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS). See [9] for additional description of the results.

3.1 Mars Microprobe

The Mars Microprobe Project (MM) consists of two identical microprobes that will penetrate the Martian surface [13, 14]. MM launched onboard the Mars Polar Lander in January, 1999 and will impact the Martian surface December 3, 1999. The mission will validate technologies that will enable future planetary network missions (e.g., simultaneous deployment of multiple landers, penetrators, etc.) while at the same time collecting science data on Martian soil conductivity, meteorology, and subsurface ice.

On MM, the project had already produced a system-level fault-coverage table, which we used as the failure analysis baseline. The table was included in the Mars Microprobe Spacecraft Design document [14]. The table, entitled “Fault Coverage,” listed for each key function (e.g., telecommunications) the types of faults that could occur (e.g., loss of uplink, loss of downlink, etc.) and the coverage that is provided for each of these fault types. Some of the fault types involved hardware failure; some involved software failure; and some involved both. The coverage for some faults was, at least in part, software-based. Response to these faults usually entailed software control of hardware devices. Onboard fault protection software exists to aid in recovery from failures during the science phase of the mission.

3.1.1 SFMECA

We worked with three MM components that are essential for mission success: Impact Detection (to detect the landing on Mars and penetration of the microprobe for initiation of science activities), the Water Experiment (to detect possible subsurface ice in a soil sample), and Telecommunications (to send data from the microprobe back to the orbiter for transmission to Earth). The estimated lines of assembly code are about 1560 for the Impact Detection sequence and 1380 for the Water Experiment sequences, excluding routines that they call (e.g., timer interrupt service routines). The Telecommunications code is about 8kB.

The initial analysis sought to verify the adequacy of the software handling of the fault types described in the system-level fault coverage table. We did this by performing SFMECA for the three critical components (impact detection, water experiment, telecommunications) described above. The objectives included first identifying critical software failures and then assessing the appropriateness of the fault avoidance and/or mitigation and of the software responsible for responding to the fault detection. For example, one of the MM components studied was Impact Detection. Three pieces of the Impact Detection software were evaluated: a software fault monitor (that detects the failure mode of an impact never being noted), an impact-related software response (to turn the accelerometer off), and the soft-
ware that controls the sequence of events after impact (detecting impact and measuring how far the probe penetrates into the Martian soil).

The SFMECA found that most of the highly critical failures involved software hang-up (halt). Depending on when in the sequence of events the hang-up occurs, such hang-ups can cause missed science experiment data (even with fault protection and recovery sequences in working order). A discussion with the software developer (a domain expert) was conducted to identify causes leading to possible software hang-up. It turned out that the MM software runs on a modified Intel-based microcontroller with a custom instruction added to the core set of microcontroller instructions. A potential software hang-up exists when this custom instruction is executed at the same time that a built-in interrupt timer goes off. Therefore, the software hang-up may be sporadic and difficult to debug. The developer then recommended a change that removed the problem.

Some key questions involving unclear definitions and missing information for anomalous scenarios surfaced during the study. For example, the value of a certain timer was unresolved in the documentation in the case that no impact had been detected. Findings such as these were given to the developer for inclusion in future design document updates.

Failure entries in the SFMECA marked as medium or high criticality were evaluated for appropriate fault identification, and avoidance or mitigation. Several such failures were identified as verifiable in test (i.e., tests can be performed to verify the absence of the potential faults). Recommendations were then made to the Project to include these test cases in their test plan.

### 3.1.2 Integrating System and Software FMEAs

A subsystem (component-level) FMEA table was constructed for the Telecom subsystem with information obtained from the project’s system design document [14]. For each failure mode, the table identified the hardware or software responsible for detecting and responding to that failure in a column labeled “Failure Detection/Correction.” This exercise showed that performing FMEA on a critical subsystem, component, or function could help identify areas requiring fault monitor and response modules.

The identification of the required fault monitors and responses laid the groundwork for the top-level (requirements/design-level) software safety analyses. In our study, three essential software-controlled monitor and response components from the Telecommunications subsystem FMEA were expanded into top-level SFMEAs. These three components were chosen because any loss of communication between the buried part of the probe that collects the science data and the above-ground part of the probe that sends science data to the orbiter is critical.

At the time that we were conducting this SFMECA study, the MM Project was transitioning into test phase. As it turned out, all the highly critical software failures identified in this study could be simulated and the correctness of the software responses verified in test. Examples of these failures were failure to recognize watchdog timer expiration, failure to reset watchdog timer, failure to activate fault response module, and critical mode transition failure. Recommendation was made to the project for inclusion of these failure scenarios in their test cases.

### 3.2 Microwave Limb Sounder

The Earth Observing System Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS) instrument, currently under development, will support an investigation to improve understanding and assessment of stratospheric ozone depletion and chemistry, tropospheric ozone distribution and chemistry, and climate change and variability [2, 3]. The MLS instrument will fly on the EOS Chemistry platform to be launched in December, 2002. The current estimate of the MLS code at completion is 11,500 lines of code, mostly in C, with some assembly code. The estimated size of the final design document is 170 pages; it is currently 146 pages.

Techniques such as SFTA that probe possible software causes of potential MLS component failures were used. The effectiveness of integrating component-level FMECA and FTA with SFTA was demonstrated in this study.

In the MLS project, the component-level FMEAs were first reviewed for potential failures where software might play a part. It was found that similar failure types appeared among the component-level FMEAs. For example, the “Loss of Bus Synchronization” failure mode appeared in two component FMEAs. When appropriate, we generalized these common failures when performing the top-level SFTA. Each of the selected failures became the top-level hazardous event (root node) of a SFTA. For each root node hazard, we worked backwards (top-down), expanding each sub-node until a basic event was reached (a leaf of the fault tree), or until no further analysis could be done.
A discussion with the software engineer on the SFTAs proved beneficial. A few software fault response behaviors were clarified, resulting in follow-up items and further analyses. Feedback from the software engineer was then incorporated into the final SFTA. The software engineer felt that this was a worthwhile exercise in evaluating all the possible failures/faults and their avoidance and mitigation.

Four MLS component-level FTAs were also reviewed. Faults (or leaf nodes of Fault Trees) that may be attributed to software failure were identified. These selected component faults became the root of a top-level SFTA. The same SFTA procedure was performed as in the component-level FMEA to top-level SFTA study.

In system and component level FMEAs and FTAs, the analyses are most frequently hardware-parts oriented. Software and operational contributing causes at the system or component level are often left out. The MLS top-level SFTAs also validated the adequacy of software commands for the control of hardware mechanisms.

The SFTAs identified the following types of fault tree leaf nodes:

- Software faults with the correct software response verifiable in test (e.g., effect of an error in the command format, incompatibility in the telemetry transmission scheme)
- Lower-level (source code) analysis required (e.g., effect of an out-of-range command parameter)
- Operational errors (e.g., incorrect command sequence)
- Hardware-attributed faults (e.g., electronic noise-induced command bit drop in the bus)
- External faults (e.g., spacecraft fails to pick up instrument telemetry).

Additional findings from the top-level SFTA included cases in which further analyses were required (e.g., instrument/software behavior resulting from executing a command in an inappropriate mode). Followup cases were needed (e.g., determining an appropriate reset mechanism for remote units), and workarounds were identified (e.g., in-flight software change to correct for corrupted register memory map.)

A web-based database application can link upper-level safety analyses to lower-level analyses. For example, a system FMEA can be linked to a component-level FMEA, and these can be linked to specific software and hardware FMEAs. This allows better traceability of safety-critical elements from the system to the software and the hardware, and to their fault avoidance or mitigation strategies. Depending on the project’s needs, links to safety requirements, tests, event sequences or design can also be implemented. The tool can also provide options to perform searches in specific areas of interest, such as failure criticality, failure modes, or affected requirements. Restricted editing capabilities can support on-line updates.

In an experimental tool development, Paul Davis created dynamic Web pages that interacted with the Mars Microprobe FMEA database. This web-based safety analysis application stores the FMEA results and provides the ability to do search and report on the FMEA entries. For example, a subsystem FMEA for Telecom is stored as one table, and a software FMEA is stored as another table. A user can search on criticality, testability, and/or failure modes in any selected combination of tables. In retrospect, an additional search option that would be useful is “Affected Requirements.”

The experimental web-based tool helped quickly locate needed information. For example, we could identify failures that were identified as testable in the earlier safety analyses and use this information to follow up in test planning and test verification when appropriate. Most importantly, the safety analysis results can be readily accessible to project developers and analysis for follow-up, further analysis of critical issues, and change impact assessments.

4. Adaptive Safety Analysis Techniques

The area of interest in this study was how smaller projects with compressed schedules and limited resources could adapt SFMECA and SFTA to their needs. The application and results of the integrated software and system analyses to two systems was described in Section 3. Here we describe four types of adaptation of the safety analysis techniques that were used in these applications.

1. Adaptation to exploit existing project analyses and documentation.

In both projects, the analyses leveraged existing documentation. For example, an existing system-level fault coverage matrix was chosen as the initiating point of the safety analysis for three com-
ponents on Mars Microprobe (MM). Those faults handled by software then served as the failure modes of the subsequent high-level SFMECA. On Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS), the project had already constructed component-level FMEAs and FTAs. In this case, the analysis extended the leaf nodes that involved software into more detailed SFTAs.

2. Adaptation to address specific project concerns.
In both projects, the developers were able to point to areas or scenarios which merited additional attention (e.g., reset mechanisms for abnormal scenarios). In general, the MM developers wanted further assurance that a failure of the fault monitoring and recovery software could not prevent (although it might degrade) mission success. Verification of fault coverage, i.e., that the software assigned to handle known fault scenarios did so reliably, was useful to the MM developers. With MLS, the developers were primarily interested in software interactions that could affect the components in unforeseen ways. For example, the analyses could verify that commands received while components were not in the correct software mode to respond could not prevent mission success or damage the hardware. Investigation of the software causes and consequences of system anomalies clarified some of the interactions of concern. The tradeoff in letting the project choose the targets of analysis is that the verification is less independent of the the developers and can miss latent problems in other components.

3. Adaptation to handle component-based, heavily embedded software.
On both projects, the software was heavily embedded in hardware components that involved leading-edge technology. The software was highly coupled with the hardware, monitoring and controlling it. On both projects, correct functioning of the components was critical to the mission’s success. In general, attention during early development had focused primarily on defining the hardware and the hardware/software interfaces, rather than on designing the software. As a consequence, we used techniques that could integrate the system and software analyses, e.g., by extending the MLS FTA with a SFTA. The emphasis was on investigating the software that monitors and responds to system failures, the contributing software causes of system failures, and the system effects of software failures.

4. Adaptation to let prior results drive the next analysis phase.
In the analysis of each instrument, the next step in the analysis was chosen dynamically based on the concerns remaining at the end of the previous stage of the analysis. For example, on MLS the existence of shared or common software failure modes (such as the bus synchronization loss) in the FMEA drove the choice of a SFTA as the next step. The SFTA then used these common failure modes as root nodes and expanded each sub-node until a basic fault event was reached or no further analysis could be performed.

Figure 2 summarizes the integration of software and system analyses. The Fault Coverage Matrix at the top of the figure was used by MM to document system failures and the software or hardware responsible for their avoidance or recovery. The second row of the figure shows how FTAs and SFTAs link failure causes and failure events, while FMEAs and SFMECAs link failure modes and failure effects. Both SFTAs and SFMECAs were used to evaluate the software’s robustness against failure.

The heavy lines in the figure show the direction of the analyses performed on one or more of the components. The dashed lines show how the results of the analyses provide verification or insight into fault mitigation and fault handling strategies. In general, adaptive analyses proceeded downwards in the figure from system to component to software emphases. Techniques on the right side of the figure tended to be used for verification of design coverage; techniques on the left side for understanding of design interactions. Horizontal movement (e.g., between SFTA and SFMECA) has been
established elsewhere as a useful way to combine the strengths of a forward and backward search, but was not performed here since the emphasis was on integrating the software and the system analyses [12].

5. Conclusions

SFMECA and SFTA are well-accepted techniques for large projects. We found that, with some adaptations, their use on two smaller, cost and schedule-constrained projects was similarly productive in verifying the design and identifying remaining areas of concern in the software/system interactions.

Some lessons learned from the adaptive application of the integrated software and system safety techniques are summarized below. The first three items describe ways in which the analysis process was scoped and structured to adapt to a smaller, constrained project. The last three items describe strengths of SFMECA and SFTA that supported this adaptive approach. The items are recommended elements of any similar process.

1. Flexible use.

We found that a key advantage of the integrated approach is that the focus of the analysis can be tailored to the needs, phase, and available documentation of the specific project. On MM this meant using the existing fault analysis work as a baseline and extending the analysis (via SFMECA) in the directions that were of most concern to the project.

2. Risk-driven

An advantage of the integrated SFMECA/SFTA approach is that it allows a dynamic re-focusing of attention to allow prior analysis results to drive the next analysis phase. For one component, a SFMECA followed by a verbal walkthrough with experts resolved the open issues. For another component, a SFMECA was later supplemented by a FTA to follow up on some issues of concern. SFMECA and/or SFTA can be performed only for those components perceived as possibly presenting unacceptable risk, or SFMECA/SFTA can be applied selectively to differing levels of detail on different components, all depending on the project’s needs.

3. “Zoom-in/zoom-out” use of SFMECA/SFTA

A consequence of the flexible use of SFMECA/SFTA is that it can provide a “zoom-in/zoom-out” approach to analysis of critical components. Selective targeting of issues of concern, designs that have changed, or areas that raise unresolved questions is possible. A “zoom-in” can be chosen to examine more closely a particular piece of the system or the effect of a particular scenario. Similarly, a “zoom-out” can be chosen to examine a wider piece of the system or the interfaces. On MM, for example, tuning the analysis to the evolution of the system meant that questions arising during the initial analysis of one component (Impact Detection) led both to a quick “zoom-out” review of the system-level interface FMEA (to check if there were any related software issues) and to a “zoom-in” on the SFMECA issue regarding software hang-up (to investigate the fault avoidance strategy).

4. SFMECA and SFTA as complementary techniques

SFMECA and SFTA have a well-deserved reputation as complementary techniques (see Section 2). In particular, the combination has been used to identify unexpected dependencies and interactions in the system. On MM we primarily performed SFMECA, since the project had already identified the critical faults that needed coverage in the system, and the causes of the faults were nearly all hardware or environmental (e.g., landing) failures. On MLS, we supplemented the FMEA with the SFTA in order to trace the possible software involvement in failures.

5. Preserving traceability

SFMECA/SFTA can be performed on a system at varying degrees of detail, so traceability between higher-level and lower-level analyses must be maintained. Sometimes the traceability among levels is explicit. For example, failure effects in a lower level FMEA may be the failure modes in the left hand column of a higher-level FMEA. Similarly, for FTA, a single node in a high-level tree may be decomposed into a more detailed FTA. Web-based support, such as that described in Section 3.3, enhances our ability to manage the traceability.

6. Applicability to fault protection software

In this study, our interest was in SFMECA/SFTA as safety analysis techniques, so we chose critical fault protection software for the applications. SFMECA is especially well-suited to analysis of fault protection monitors and responses. For monitoring software, SFMECA was used to check that false-positives were not produced and that adequate reasonableness checks were performed on
the values used to make control decisions. For fault protection software that responds to faults, SFMECA was used to check that the effect of the response (e.g., reconfiguration, try-again, etc.) matched the intent of the fault response. By dynamically adapting the integrated software and system safety techniques to the needs and realities of the two projects, the analyses provided some assurance that the fault coverage specified in the design document was adequate and robust.

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References


